

PHUNG HOANG

1. Since the preparation of the 21 January 1972 PHUNG HOANG paper, several trends in the anti-VCI effort have become more pronounced and the future direction of the effort has become clearer.

2. On the Vietnamese side, the two recently declared trends continue -- on the one hand, there is the phaseout of all but national-level PH Committees as semi-independent units, while the other side of the coin is the assumption by the police of the anti-VCI responsibility.

3. This picture of Vietnamese activity is reflected in a pair of trends on the U.S. side. There is the U.S. military drawdown continuing while the question of responsibility for advice and support to the future police force is emerging.

4. On the U.S. side, there are several immediate problems to be sorted out:

(A) While paragraph 19 of the 21 January PHUNG HOANG paper requested a continuing support plan from the U.S. Mission, the tempo of cuts, particularly the requirement for a 15,000 military force ceiling by 1 November with zero-basing in the offing, is forcing the situation on the ground in a possibly divergent direction. Furthermore, the method of implementation of the cuts -- by shortening tours -- can potentially play hob with phased drawdown.

Therefore, a message to the Mission is needed which (1) sets a 1 November ceiling for military drawdown in PH advisor slots and (2) excepts the PH advisor program from the short tour framework so that more rational planning can take place.

5. The time has come to project the time when we can drop the PHUNG HOANG advisor label. When the last U. S. military PHUNG HOANG advisor leaves, the word should drop from the U. S. vocabulary.

6. Paragraph 21 of the 21 January PHUNG HOANG paper has been received by the Mission with some question as to what was intended. This confusion should be cleared up by sending the Mission an amplification of the question:

- (A) Who will advise the police on their counter-subversive responsibilities?
- (B) Who will advise the Field Police on their counter-subversive responsibility?
- (C) Who will advise the Special Police on their counter-subversive responsibility?
- (D) Who will advise the various other elements of the GVN who have an anti-VCI responsibility -- the MSS, the Province Chiefs, the District Chiefs?
- (E) What will become of the PRU? Who will advise the PRU?

- (F) What will be the relationship between all counter-subversion advisors, especially between U.S. police advisors, U.S. special police advisors, and U.S. Field police advisors?
- (G) Who will take responsibility for the training facilities currently used to support the anti-VCI program?
- (H) Who will take responsibility for making intelligence estimates (f) VCI strength and capabilities?